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Private Agricultural R&D 
in the United States 
Simla Tokgoz 
The objective of  this study is to analyze the determinants of  private agricultural 
R&D investment in the United States and the liaison between public and private 
R&D  sectors.  The  empirical  analysis  employs  U.S.  agricultural  data for  the 
1970-1996 period. The results show that federal R&D obligations for basic research, 
used as a proxy for the complementary role of public R&D, have a significant and 
positive impact on private agricultural R&D spending. In contrast, federal R&D 
obligations for applied research, used as a proxy for the substitute role of  public 
R&D, are not found to have a significant impact. 
Key words: applied public agricultural R&D, basic public agricultural R&D, private 
agricultural R&D, quality innovation model, technical change 
Introduction 
The performance of U.S. agriculture during the  post-war period is noteworthy. Agricul- 
ture has experienced one of the highest productivity growth rates of all industries, and 
productivity growth is a major source of  output growth. An extensive literature has 
focused on the determinants of  productivity growth in agriculture, particularly on the 
roles of public and private research and development (R&D).  Ample empirical evidence 
shows that these activities play an important role in productivity gains. 
The public sector has traditionally taken the lead in agricultural R&D activities, 
aided by a system which includes both federal and state institutions, as well as an 
extension system entrusted with helping to disseminate the new technology. However, 
recent developments in the agricultural R&D sector suggest the need to reexamine the 
role of public and private R&D sectors. The level and the composition of both public and 
private R&D investment have changed over the last two decades. Specifically, the 
growth rates of  federal obligations for basic and applied R&D for the biological and 
agricultural sciences have decreased and have sometimes become negative in real terms. 
On the other hand, the level of private R&D investment has increased dramatically in 
real terms. Consequently, the private R&D sector appears to have emerged as an 
equally, if not more, important part of  R&D activities for the U.S. agricultural sector. 
Various factors have been identified as  possible reasons for the increasing role of the 
private sector in agricultural R&D, such as  improvements in the biotechnology sector 
and strengthened patent protection for biological inventions. These developments in  the 
scope and amount of private and public R&D investment have generated a need to find 
a new way for analyzing the division of labor between public and private R&D sectors. 
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As private R&D firms have gained the ability to appropriate the  benefits from their own 
research, the rationale for government intervention in terms of providing the socially 
optimal amount of research has become weaker. 
In light of the above discussion, the objective of this paper is to analyze the determi- 
nants of private agricultural R&D investment in the United States. In  this context, the 
liaison between private agricultural R&D investment and public agricultural R&D invest- 
ment is investigated as  well. First, the relationship between R&D activities and technical 
change in the U.S. agricultural sector is modeled with a focus on how the mechanism of 
the domestic private R&D sector operates. Second, the model analyzes the determinants 
of private R&D spending, including its relation with the public R&D sector. 
In an  earlier empirical study focusing on factors that affect private agricultural R&D 
investments, Alafranca and Huffman (2001)  examined the  effects of economic incentives 
and institutions on national private agricultural R&D  investments. They similarly 
analyzed the relation between public and private R&D sectors and found that, in their 
sample countries, lagged public research capital reduces current agricultural private 
R&D expenditure. There are two fundamental differences between the current study 
and the earlier Alafranca and Huffman work. First, this study investigates the U.S. 
agricultural sector, whereas Alafranca and Huffman examined seven European Union 
member countries. Second, their analysis also included the impact of  institutions on 
private R&D investments in those EU countries. Because the  empirical analysis  portion 
of the  current study relies on a theoretical model to identify the  factors affecting private 
R&D investments, the  focus is more on economic factors that are  captured by the model, 
rather than on the institutional structure in the economy. 
This study attempts to provide a framework for analyzing the role of the  public R&D 
sector and the link between private and public R&D by examining how the  private R&D 
sector operates. To this end, a quality innovation model is used in which both public and 
private sectors' R&D activities lead to technical change. The public R&D sector conducts 
research and  patents its research results in the same  manner as  the  private R&D sector. 
This type of public-sector R&D activity is a substitute for private-sector R&D. Another 
public-sector R&D activity is included through a subsidy that effectively  lowers the cost 
of research for private firms, and through this mechanism, the public R&D sector is a 
complement to the private R&D sector. 
The objective of the empirical work based on this model is to explore the  factors that 
determine private agricultural R&D investment. To do this, in the empirical portion of 
the  analysis,  the  implications of the  model are  tested using data  for the  U.S. agricultural 
sector for the period 1970 through 1996. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as  follows. First, a discussion is provided on the 
changing role of public and private R&D sectors in the U.S. agricultural sector. Next, 
the quality innovation model is described. Empirical specification is then presented, 
followed by a description of the data and their sources. After a discussion on the empir- 
ical methodology and the results of  the empirical analysis, the final section provides 
concluding remarks. 
The Changing Role of Public and Private R&D Sectors 
Agricultural R&D activities in the United States historically have been dominated by 
the public sector. The economic rationale used to  justify the government's intervention 
in R&D has been market failure. Because the knowledge acquired from some type of 2 14  August 2006  Journal ofAgricultura1 and Resource Economics 
Table 1. U.S. Agricultural Sector: Research and Development Expenditures 
and Average Annual Growth Rates (1970-1996) 
Federal Basic  Federal Applied  Private Sector 
R&D Obligations  R&D Obligations  R&D Spending 
Expenditures  Avg. Annual  Expenditures  Avg. Annual  Expenditures  Avg. Annual 
Decades  ($000~)  Growth Rate  ($000~)  Growth Rate  ($000~)  Growth Rate 
Note: Expenditures are in thousands of  1996 dollars. 
Table 2. Research Expenditures by Agricultural Industries (1970-1996) 
Expenditures  Percent  Expenditures  Percent 
Research Program Area  ($ mill.)  of Total  ($ mill.)  of Total 
Plant Breeding  26.30  10.18%  526.13  18.77% 
Agricultural Chemicals  98.00  37.94%  1,458.66  51.83% 
Farm Machinery  89.00  34.46%  505.66  17.97% 
Veterinary Pharmaceuticals  45.00  17.42%  323.70  11.50% 
Total  258.30  2,814.15 
Note: Expenditures are in millions of  current dollars. 
R&D activities is of a public good nature, private agents are unlikely to undertake the 
socially optimal level of R&D activity-i.e.,  if it is not possible to capture the benefits 
from their research, private-sector entrepreneurs are  unwilling to invest sufficient funds 
in R&D, and therefore government must make up for this deficiency. As a result of this 
conceptualization, the division of labor between public and private R&D traditionally 
has been defined as the public sector concentrating on basic research (pre-technology 
research) and the private sector concentrating on  applied research and technology 
development W.S. Department ofAgriculture/Economic  Research Service  (USDAIERS), 
1999; Huffman and Evenson, 19931. 
Recent developments in the agricultural R&D sector, however, have necessitated 
rethinking the division of labor between the public and private sectors. Table 1  shows the 
level of federal obligations  for basic R&D,  federal obligations  for applied R&D, and private 
agricultural R&D spending for different decades in thousands of  1996 dollars, as  well as 
the corresponding average annual growth rate ofthese  variables. Between 1970  and 1996, 
private R&D expenditure increased more than 165%,  whereas federal obligations for 
basic R&D increased 97% and federal obligations for applied R&D increased 73%. 
As reported in table 1, federal obligations for basic R&D had a negative average 
growth rate for the 1990-1996 period, and federal obligations for applied R&D had a 
negative average growth rate  for the 1980-1989 period. However, private R&D spending 
always experienced a positive growth rate in all decades included in this study, achieving 
the highest growth rate in the 1970-1979 period. Hence, the private sector already has 
become an important factor in R&D activities for the U.S. agricultural sector. Tokgoz  Private Agricultural R&D in the United States  2 15 
The categories of private R&D investment changed over time, too. Table 2 shows that 
expenditures on "plant breeding" and "agricultural chemicals" as a ratio of total private 
R&D spending increased, whereas the ratio of research spending on "veterinary phar- 
maceuticals" and "farm machinery" decreased in total private R&D spending. 
Different factors have been identified as  possible reasons for the changing role of the 
private sector in agricultural R&D.  It has been argued that improvements in the 
biotechnology sector in combination with strengthened patent protection for biological 
inventions helped private firms find new sources of profit from agricultural R&D and 
secure better returns from their investments (USDA/ERS, 1999; Fuglie et al., 1996). 
The Quality Innovation Model 
The quality innovation model used in this study is an endogenous growth model with 
an R&D sector which is the source of technical change. The main feature of the model 
is that technical change is modeled to be the result of commercially motivated efforts of 
private-sector researchers responding to economic incentives and a public R&D sector. 
The contribution of the model is its exploration of the liaison between a private and a 
public R&D  sector. Both of  these sectors engage in research activities that lead to 
improvements in the quality of  intermediate goods, which in turn are used in the 
production of  output. The private sector represents the profit-maximizing behavior of 
entrepreneurs, whereas the public sector represents R&D conducted by public institu- 
tions which are not motivated by profit. The model is based on Barro and Sala-I-Martin 
(1995, chapter 71,  and Grossman and Helpman (1991, chapter 4). 
The link between public and private R&D consists of two channels. The public R&D 
sector acts as a substitute for the private R&D sector, as it not only engages in R&D but 
also earns exclusive property rights to the results of  its research efforts, which may 
drive an incumbent private-sector firm out of  business. The public sector acts as a 
complement to the private sector by lowering the cost of research for private firms. This 
can be achieved through various tools, such as conducting "basic research" and making 
the results publicly available, providing incentives for private R&D through tax breaks 
or direct subsidies, and providing public funds to private firms through competitive 
grants. 
Although economic factors impact the level of public R&D spending in the United 
States,  other critical determinants of public R&D spending are economic and political 
decisions on the federal and state levels, organization of  the federal and state R&D 
institutions, and the scientific goals of  these institutions. The public R&D sector 
consists of many different components, including the U.S. Department ofAgriculture, 
State Agricultural Experiment Stations (SAES), and land-grant universities. Thus, 
there are various mechanisms through which these decisions are made, such as federal 
funds allocated to states by formula, and competitive grants. As public R&D sector 
spending incorporates many diverse spending categories which are also governed by 
forces other than economic incentives, the public R&D sector is taken as exogenous 
in this model.' 
'  For a more detailed discussion of public R&D funding, see Day-Rubenstein et  al. (2000), who focused on USDA funding 
to states, and Khanna, Huffman, and Sandler (1994), who set up a model in which agricultural R&D spending by the states 
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The main feature of the production technology assumed here is the disaggregation 
of capital into a finite number of distinct types of intermediate goods (indexed by 
j = 1, ...,  N). Each intermediate good has a quality ladder along which improvements can 
occur. Research efforts are aimed at  increasing the  existing quality of each intermediate 
good and are based on the currently available technology. 
When a product is improved, it tends to replace the lower-quality version in the 
market. In this study, it  is assumed that a higher-quality product is a perfect substitute 
for its lower-quality counterpart-i.e.,  it renders the older version obsolete. So, in the 
equilibrium, only the highest-quality intermediate goods are produced by the R&D 
sector and used by the producers of the final good to generate output. (In other words, 
instantaneous adoption of new technology is assumed.) 
The quality innovation model characterizes technical change in the form of  a con- 
tinuing series of improvements and refinements of existing goods and techniques rather 
than basic innovations that amount to dramatically new kinds of goods and methods of 
production (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995).  Examples of technical changes in the U.S. 
agricultural sector of  this nature include use of hybrid seeds, adoption of  improved 
livestock breeding practices, and more effective agricultural chemicals, fertilizers, and 
 pesticide^.^ In the model, each successful researcher, whether private or public, gains 
exclusive property rights over the use of the higher-quality intermediate good he or she 
creates. Private R&D firms operate in an  imperfectly competitive market setting. When 
a private R&D firm is successful in upgrading the quality of  an intermediate good, it 
receives a flow of monopoly profit. The researcher who succeeds in upgrading the quality 
of  an intermediate good is different from the person who has invented the previously 
highest-quality intermediate good. Consequently, the success of an innovator, whether 
public or private, terminates the  profit flow to the previous private-sector innovator. As 
it is uncertain whether the outcome of  any research effort will be successful, the 
duration of this profit flow for the current patent holder is random. Hence, not only the 
size of the  profit flow, but also its  duration, determines the amount of resources devoted 
to research by private firms. 
Production Technology 
The agricultural output is produced in a perfectly competitive market using land, labor, 
and a set of N different types of  intermediate goods. The production function is con- 
structed as: 
where 0 < a < 1,0  < p < 1, and 0 < a + p < 1;  Y denotes agricultural output; L is land input; 
His  labor input; and &  is the quality-adjusted  amount employed of the  jth type of inter- 
mediate good. The production function specifies diminishing marginal productivity of 
each input and constant returns to scale in all inputs t~gether.~ 
Another type of technical change can be analyzed in a variety innovation model in which new goods and production pro- 
cesses are invented. Introduction of the tractor to agricultural production is a rather dramatic change representing an 
example of a variety innovation model. 
3The  additively separable  form for (4)''  suggests the marginal  product of intermediate good X,, is  independent of the quan- 
tity employed of intermediate good X,,,  where j i  1. Tokgoz  Private Agricultural R&D in the United States  2 17 
A(E)  is the other component of technology available to producers. Because extension 
services have been critically important in the United States in the dissemination and 
adoption of new technology, A(E)  is not modeled as a positive constant that illustrates 
the level of technology, but as a positive function of the extension services actually 
carried out in the agricultural ~ector.~ 
The potential quality grades of each intermediate good are arrayed along a quality 
ladder with rungs spread proportionately at an interval of q,  where q  Inventions 
occur in the form of  increases in the quality rungs of  each intermediate good as a 
multiple of q.  Therefore, the quality-adjusted input from sector j can be written as: 
where K~ denotes the highest quality available to producers. 
Behavior of  Firms 
The firms that produce agricultural output operate in a perfectly competitive market. 
Their profit-maximization problem is written as: 
A. 
max  ny=PAGR*y-i*~-w  +H-CPJ,,+X,,, 
L,H,XjKj  j=1 
where PA,  is the price of output, i  is the rental rate of land, and w  is the wage rate of 
labor. 
In contrast, the private R&D sector is monopolistically competitive. The researcher 
who creates a new and higher-quality intermediate good in sector  j gains the monopoly 
right to produce and sell that intermediate good. The marginal cost of  producing an 
intermediate good is the same  for all the qualities and is equal to 1. The monopolist pro- 
ducer of the intermediate good with quality level K~  will choose price  to maximize its 
profits. Then, the profit-maximization problem for a private researcher is expressed as: 
max P  = (q,,  - 1)  * TK,. 
I;., 
From this optimization problem, the price for each intermediate good is derived as 
P,  = P  = lla,  which is a markup over the cost of prod~ction.~ 
In order to show that only the highest-quality intermediate goods are produced and 
used in eq~ilibrium,~  we need to look at the pricing of  different qualities of the same 
intermediate good. Each unit of  a leading-edge intermediate good is equivalent to q 
units of the next-best good. If P,,, is the price of the highest-quality intermediate good, 
then (?,,lq) is the price of the  next-best available intermediate good. If (lla  * q)  c 1,  then 
Makki, Thraen, and Tweeten (19991, and Huffman and Evenson (1993) are among the many researchers  who have found 
a positive and significant impact of extension services on total factor productivity (TFP)  in the U.S.  agricultural sector. 
See Eaton and Korturn (1996) for a model in which the step size of the invention, q, is stochastic. 
The quantity produced of the jth  intermediate good is derived by using the previous two optimization  problems as: 
V(l-a)*A(E)v(i-~)*L~~-=-p)/(~-=)*Hp/(~-~)*  az~~~-~)  x,, = PA,  * 9K~-an'-e). 
Otherwise, there is no closed-form solution forX(intermediate goods) and Y (output). 2 18  August 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
the producer of the next-best intermediate good will not be able to compete against the 
leader's monopoly price, and therefore monopoly pricing will prevail. So, if q is suffi- 
ciently large, then lower-grade intermediate goods will be driven out of  the market. If 
(lla  *q)  > 1,  then the limit pricing strategy employed by Grossman and Helpman (1991) 
could be followed with the same result. In both cases, only the  highest-quality intermed- 
iate goods are produced and used, and the price of the intermediate good is a markup 
over the marginal cost of production. 
Equilibrium R&D Effort 
Let Q denote an aggregate quality index defined as 
Then, the equilibrium level of agricultural output is written as: 
Technical change in equation (4) is attained through the increases in Q, which in turn 
increase the output. Q increases because of the R&D efforts of  both public and private 
R&D sectors. To analyze the determinants of change in this aggregate quality index, we 
need to examine how the private R&D sector operates and the role of  the public R&D 
sector in this process. 
Public and Private R&D Sectors 
The private-sector researcher who innovates the ~~th  quality of intermediate good  j will 
accrue his or her profits until a new researcher comes up with the (K~  + 1)th  quality inter- 
mediate good j. The duration of this profit is random, and it depends on the efforts of 
private R&D firms and the public R&D sector. 
To illustrate this relationship, letp*  be the probability per unit of time of an increase 
in quality from K~ to (K,  + I),  i.e., the society's probability of innovation. It  is equal to the 
sum of  the probability  of  innovation by the public sector, pp, and the probability of 
innovation by the  private sector, pij.  The duration ofmonopoly profits for the  private R&D 
firm depends on p*,  not on p$j. As both public and private R&D sectors can invent the 
next higher-quality intermediate good, the probability of success of both of these sectors 
determines how long the current leader will accrue his or her monopoly profits. 
This is clearer when the expected present value of  the next invention to a private 
R&D firm is derived as: 
The expected present value of the next innovation is lower when a public R&D sector 
exists, as  in this case the denominator containspP  as  well as  p<j. When both public- and 
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higher probability that the next higher-quality intermediate good will be invented, 
thereby increasing the probability of the incumbent being driven out of business by the 
next innovator, and lowering the expected present value of his or her profits from the 
next invention by a private-sector researcher. That is why, in this model, the public- 
sector R&D may crowd out the private-sector R&D. 
Private-Sector Research Effort 
The flow of  resources expended by the aggregate of  private potential inventors in 
intermediate-good sector j, when the highest quality in that sector is K~,  is denoted as 
Zj,.  The relation between p:j  and Zj,  is defined as: 
As ZjK, increases, the probability of successful invention per unit of time in that sector 
increases. The second term, @(K~),  is added to reflect the complexity of aresearch  project, 
and C~@(K~)/~K~  < 0. In this model, p '  and p:j  are assumed to follow a Poisson proces~.~ 
Assuming free entry into the research business, the society's probability of innovation 
is derived as: 
If constant returns to R&D are assumed, the functional form for @(K~)  becomes 
(14s *C))*q 
-(Kj+l)t~/(l-U) .  9 Th  en, the society's probability of innovation becomes: 
The parameter C > 0 represents the fxed cost of research: a higher C lowers the proba- 
bility of success for given values of ZjKj  and K~.  The parameter s takes a value between 
0 and 1. This is the second channel through which public-sector activities affect the 
private R&D sector of the model. The parameter s is a subsidy equivalent of  public- 
sector activities  which effectively lowers the cost of research for the private R&D sector. 
Here it lowers C, which is the fixed cost of research for private R&D firms. Through this 
channel, the public R&D sector acts as a complement to the private R&D sector. 
In equation (6),  only the current level of  private R&D spending is included through Z,?,  and past R&D investments 
enter indirectly through K].  As K]  is the total number of inventions in intermediate-good sector  j, it is directly related to all 
past research successes. 
In equation (7), the probability of  innovation increases as K~ and q'K~'l""l~a' mcrease.  '  The probability of  innovation 
decreases as  K,  increases and $I(K~)  decreases. If the first effect dominates, the more advanced sectors will grow faster. If the 
second effect dominates, the more advanced sectors  will grow slower. If the two forces offset each other, then all intermediate- 
good sectors will grow at the same rate and the growth rate of  the agricultural sector will be constant over time and across 
intermediate-good  sectors. In the rest of  the solution,  it will be assumed that these two forces offset each other, i.e., constant 
returns to R&D. 220  August 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
After solving for the probability of an innovation per unit of time by the private R&D 
sector, the aggregate private-sector R&D spending is derived as  follows: 
Equation (9) shows that the private R&D spending is endogenously determined and 
depends on the decisions of economic agents and institutions taking part in the produc- 
tion and research process. It also gives information about which economic variables 
affect private R&D  spending. First, both the aggregate quality index (Q) and the 
productivity parameter (A(E  )) have a positive impact on private R&D spending. Second, 
public R&D  sector activities  affect Z through two variables. Through the subsidy 
parameter (0 < s <I),  the public R&D sector increases private R&D spending. However, 
the probability of  innovation by the public R&D sector (pP)  decreases private R&D 
spending, as it increases the probability of being driven out of business. The net effect 
of public-sector activities on the level of  private R&D spending is ambiguous in the 
model; this is an empirical question that depends on the relative magnitude of these 
competing forces. The interest rate, r, is negatively related to the level of Z. As the 
interest rate increases, the rate of return required from the research project which will 
make the project feasible to undertake will be higher. With a higher interest rate, there 
will be fewer projects meeting this criterion in terms of profitability, and the amount of 
research will be lower. The price of  output, land input, and labor input have a positive 
impact on the level of  private R&D spending. 
Empirical Specification 
The model provides an analysis of private R&D investment [equation (9)1, where Z = 
f(Q,PAGR,A(E),  L,  H, r,pp,s)  as q and care constants. From the Taylor series expan- 
sion of this function, a linear approximation for equation (9) is obtained as follows: 
Rearranging the terms of (10) will give: 
As a proxy for Q, the aggregate quality index, we use the number of  agricultural 
patents granted in the United States (P,).  In the model, the source of  technical change 
is the increase in the aggregate quality index, which is defined as: 
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As K~  is the total number of  quality upgrades in intermediate-good sector j, Q can be 
thought of as a measure of the total number of innovations in the R&D sector. Thus, as 
a proxy for the aggregate quality index, the number of granted patents manufactured 
by the firms operating in the agricultural sector is used. 
In this context, it  should be noted that although patents provide a good approximation 
to inventive activity, they provide an imperfect measure of it. First, not all inventions 
are  patented. Second, not all patents are equally significant in an  industry. And finally, 
not all patented inventions are adopted by producers. 
Patent data have been used either as a proxy for input into inventive activity or as 
an output of inventive activity. Schimmelpfennig and Thirtle (1999) used patent data 
to calculate private and publicR&D stocks in the agricultural sector, whereas Eaton and 
Kortum (1996) used patent data as an indirect measure of  innovation while exploring 
implications of  a quality innovation model on the relation between productivity and 
innovation. Because the aim of the current study is to use patent data to measure tech- 
nical change, patent data are included as a proxy for output of inventive activity. 
Another important point is that  this study uses the  number of granted patents rather 
than the number of patent applications. As emphasized by Griliches (1998), the trends 
in patent grants do not always follow the trends of the patent applications. "A patent is 
granted if it passes certain minimal standards of  novelty and potential utility. These 
standards change over time. A change in the resources of the patent office or its efficiency 
will introduce changes in the lag structure of grants behind applications" (p. 322). 
PA,,,, is the price of  agricultural output, for which an index of  prices received by 
farmers, deflated by the GDP deflator, is used as  a proxy. A(E),  the productivity param- 
eter, was defined as  the other component of technology available to producers. Because 
extension services have played a significant role in the dissemination and adoption of 
new technology in the United States, A(E) was modeled as a function of  extension 
services. Hence, extension spending (denoted by E,) is included as a proxy forA(E).  L, 
represents land input, and H, is labor input in the U.S. agricultural sector. For r,, the 
ex post real interest rate is used. 
The remaining two variables show the impact of  public R&D spending on private 
R&D spending. The first of these is s,  the subsidy parameter. In the model, parameter 
s is the subsidy equivalent of public-sector activities which effectively lowers the cost of 
R&D for the  private sector. Specifically,  it  is the portion of the public R&D sector activi- 
ties that complements the private R&D sector. As a proxy for s, we use data for federal 
R&D obligations for basic research (B,). The rationale for this choice is that the results 
of basic research create a knowledge base upon which the private R&D sector can rely 
to conduct research more geared toward the market. The second variable, pP is the 
probability of innovation by the public R&D sector. This variable shows the substitute 
effect of  the public R&D sector to the private R&D sector-i.e.,  the public R&D sector 
can introduce a new intermediate good which can replace the lower-quality version, and 
therefore can capture the market away from the incumbent private R&D firm. As a 
proxy for pP, data for federal R&D obligations for applied research are used (C,).  The 
reason for this choice is  that public applied research is directed more toward generation 
of new products, i.e., activities similar in nature to private R&D sector activities. 
Based on the above discussion, the empirical equation for private R&D investment 
is written as: 222  August 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 3. Summary Statistics: U.S. Agricultural Sector, 1970-1996 (N  = 27 years) 
Standard 
Variable  Mean  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Federal Obligations for Basic R&D (1996 $000~) 
Federal Obligations for Applied R&D (1996 $000~) 
Private R&D (1996 $000~) 
Patents (Sectors 1-7) 
Patents (Sectors 1-8) 
Extension Spending (1996 $000~) 
Agricultural Employment (000s) 
Land in Farms (000s of acres) 
Real Interest Rate (%) 
Price Index (1996 = 100) 
Data Sources and Variables 
This analysis uses U.S. agricultural sector data  for the 1970-1996 period. All of the data 
are logarithms, except for the ex post real interest rate. The summary statistics for the 
data are given in table 3. 
Private agricultural R&D spending data were estimated by Klotz, Fuglie, and Pray 
(1995) and are also provided on the USDA web site. All the spending data series used 
for this analysis are in thousands of 1996 dollars converted from current dollars by the 
Research  Deflator.''  The  industries  included  in the data set are plant breeding, 
agricultural chemicals, farm machinery, and veterinary pharmaceuticals (as shown in 
table 2). Estimates of biotechnology expenditures in private-sector biotechnology firms 
are not included here to avoid double-counting. The agricultural industries that are 
included already incorporate biotechnology research expenditures within their R&D 
expenditures. 
Federal obligations for basic and applied research were taken from the National 
Science Foundation (2004) publication, Federal Funds for  Research and Development: 
Fiscal Years 1970-2003; Federal Obligations for Research by Agency and Detailed Field 
of  Science  and Engineering. The data set provides federal obligations for basic and 
applied research for biological and agricultural sciences in fiscal years. In this data set, 
basic research is defined as "systematic study directed toward fuller knowledge and 
understanding of the fundamental aspects ofphenomena and of observable facts without 
specific applications towards processes and products in mind." Applied research refers 
to "systematic study to gain knowledge or understanding necessary to determine the 
means by which a recognized and specific need may be met." Both series are in 
thousands of  1996 dollars converted from current dollars by the Research Deflator. 
'O The Research Deflator is from a study by Klotz, Fuglie, and Pray (1995)  and it is used to deflate federal R&D obligations, 
private R&D spending, and extension funds. Previous studies have shown the cost of  conducting research generally rises 
faster than the overall rate of inflation (Pardey, Craig, and Hallaway, 1989; Hffian  and Evenson, 1993).  Research activity 
uses a different set of  goods than the bundle of goods included while calculating CPI or GDP deflators. Adjusting nominal 
research expenditures by CPI and GDP deflators may overstate the trend in real research spending over time. Klotz, Fuglie, 
and Pray (1995)  construct the Research Deflator following the methodology developed by Pardey, Craig, and Hallaway (1989). Tokgoz  Private Agricultural R&D in the United States  223 
Agricultural extension spending includes total funds for cooperative extension by 
funding  source-federal,  state, and county. The sources for these data  are  Alston and 
Pardey (1996)  for 1970-1994 and the  USDA's Cooperative State  Research, Education, 
and Extension Service (CSREES) for 1995-1996. Again, the series is in thousands of 
1996 dollars converted from current dollars by the Research Deflator. 
Agricultural patent data were taken from the U.S. Historical Patent Data Set, con- 
structed by Johnson (1999). These agricultural patent data were created based on the 
Wellesley Technology Concordance (WTC)  and the  Yale Technology Concordance  (YTC). 
The International Patent Classification (IPC) system distinguishes patents by type of 
product or process; it does not provide information on the number of patents granted by 
industry. Therefore, these data are of limited use for the type of analysis conducted in 
this study. YTC was designed to translate these IPC definitions of patents to industries 
of  manufacture (IOMs) and sectors of  use (SOUS).''  WTC was developed by Johnson 
(1999)  as a concordance between the U.S. Patent Classification (USPC) system and the 
internationally standard IPC. It uses information from patents granted in the United 
States to build a concordance between USPC and IPC systems. The output from WTC 
is used as  input into YTC, and a historical patent series for the United States  is created 
following an  IOM and SOU structure. The patent data set used in this study is the total 
number of granted patents whose IOM is the agricultural sector. The sectors included 
in the calculation of  patent data are seven agricultural sectors (livestock, crops and 
combo farms, fruits and vegetables, horticulture, service to livestock, service to crops, 
and other), and forestry and fishing as the eighth sector. 
The price of output is  an  index of prices received for all farm products, deflated by the 
GDP deflator, taken from the USDA's National Agricultural Statistics Service Agricul- 
tural Statistics database. The real interest rate (r,)  is the annual interest rate on U.S. 
Treasury bills with one-year maturity from Federal Reserve Statistical Release minus 
the ex post inflation rate from the Consumer Price Index provided by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. Labor is employment in the U.S. agricultural and related industries 
(in  thousands)  obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Land is U.S. land in farms 
(in thousand acres) obtained from the USDA's National Agricultural Statistics Service 
Agricultural Statistics database. 
Empirical Methodology 
First, autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions of the  variables were plotted 
and stationarity tests were conducted using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. These 
tests revealed that the variables are nonstationary (as  reported in appendix A). Makki, 
Thraen, and Tweeten (1999) found there are problems associated with making infer- 
ences based on time-series regression analysis when variables have strong trends and 
are nonstationary. In cases like this, statistical tests of  coefficient estimates can be 
biased toward accepting a spurious  relationship. Thus, all variables are  first-differenced 
to make them stationary. Plots of autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions, 
as  well as  augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, show that first-differencing has  made the 
"  The sectors of  use are the demand sectors that use the new technology. The industries of manufacture are the supplying 
sectors that develop the innovations. For example, a pesticide sprayer has chemical fertilizer or agricultural machinery as 
its industry of manufacture, but its sector of use is field crop sector. 224  August 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
variables stationary (as  seen in appendix B). Therefore, the final specification for 
private R&D spending is constructed as: 
Empirical Analysis Results 
In  the empirical analysis, two sets of patent data were tried. The first includes the 
following seven sectors: livestock, crops and combo farms, fruits and vegetables, horti- 
culture, service to livestock, service to crops, and other. The second patent data set is 
formed by adding  an  eighth sector, forestry and  fishing. The Schwarz Criterion (SC)  and 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) were employed to choose between the two patent 
data  sets. It  was also necessary to choose the starting period of lags for the explanatory 
variables. Thus, SC and  AIC were again employed to select the  final model specification. 
Ordinary least squares regression is used to estimate the coefficients. 
The  results  for the  private R&D equation are  reported in  table 4. Columns [A1 present 
the  results for the  first set of patent data,  which includes the original seven agricultural 
sectors. Because this model yields the lowest SC and AIC values, it is the focus of the 
narrative discussion that follows. For ease of comparison, however, the results for the 
alternative model specification, incorporating patent data using eight sectors, are also 
presented in  table 4 (columns [Bl).  Finally,  for illustrative purposes, a subset  of different 
model specifications and their respective SC values are given in table 5. 
As shown by table 4, basic public R&D activity, measured by federal R&D obligations 
for basic research, has a positive and significant coefficient estimate. In  the  theoretical 
model, the  basic public R&D activity that  helped private R&D, captured by the subsidy 
parameters, had a positive impact on the variable 2,  the private R&D spending. It was 
incorporated into  the  theoretical model to show the  portion of public R&D activities  with 
a complementary nature, and this model proposed that basic R&D activities by the 
public sector would fall  into  this category. The above result suggests federal R&D obliga- 
tions for basic research,  used as  a proxy for the complementary role of public R&D, have 
a significant and positive impact on private R&D spending. 
Applied public R&D activity, as measured by federal R&D obligations for applied 
research, does not have a significant coefficient estimate (table 4). In the theoretical 
model, the applied portion of public R&D activity that competed with the private R&D 
sector was captured by the parameter  pP, the probability of innovation by the public 
R&D sector-i.e.,  the probability of the public R&D sector driving out the incumbent 
private R&D firm. This value had a negative relation with the variable 2,  the private 
R&D spending. It was incorporated into the theoretical model to  represent the portion 
of public R&D activities with a substitute nature, and  it  was hypothesized that applied 
R&D activities by the public sector would fall into this category. The above finding 
reveals that  federal R&D obligations for applied research, used as  a proxy for the substi- 
tute role of public R&D, do not have a significant impact on private R&D spending, 
which is contrary to what the theoretical model proposed. 
The agricultural patents variable is added to capture the effect of past successes on 
private R&D, i.e., Q, the aggregate quality index in  the model. The empirical results Tokgoz  Private Agricultural R&D in the United States  225 
Table 4. OLS Regression Results for the Private R&D Equation Specifications 
Variable 
Private R&D Spending:  Private R&D Spending: 
1st  Patent Data Set, w/7 Sectors  2nd Patent Data Set, w/8 Sectors 
Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
Intercept  -0.0204**  0.0076  -0.0203**  0.0078 
Basic Public R&D,.,  0.6936**  0.1782  0.6895**  0.1839 
Applied Public R&D,.,  0.2349  0.1343  0.2329  0.1379 
Patents,.,  -0.2457**  0.1060  -0.2347*  0.1100 
Price,.,  -0.0444  0.1951  -0.0500  0.2002 
Extension,.,  -0.0926**  0.0399  -0.0954**  0.0408 
Land,.,  -  11.1192**  2.4940  -  10.9072**  2.5601 
Labor,.,  0.7182**  0.3179  0.7034*  0.3260 
Real Interest Rate,.,  -0.4175*  0.1997  -0.4182*  0.2049 
N  20  20 
R  0.8195  0.8099 
Schwarz Criterion  -7.5786  -7.5268 
Akaike Information Criterion  -8.0266  -7.9749 
Notes: Single and double asterisks (*) denote statistical significance at the 10%  and 5% levels, respectively. 
Specification [A1  uses patents manufactured by the following seven agricultural sectors: livestock, crops and combo 
farms,  fruits and vegetables,  horticulture, service to livestock,  service to  crops, and other. Specification [Bl uses patents 
manufactured by all eight sectors, which include the seven identified under [A] plus the forestry and fishing sector. 
Table 5. Sample Model Specifications and Their SC Values 
Basic R&D  Applied R&D  Schwarz Criterion 




Sectors 1-8  7  6  -7.303 
Sectors 1-8  7  6  -7.248 
Sectors 1-8  7  6  -7.526 
Notes: The first patent data set (sectors 1-7) includes the following seven sectors: livestock, crops and combo farms, 
fruits and vegetables, horticulture, service to livestock, service to crops, and other. The second patent data set 
(sectors 1-8) includes the original seven sectors identified above, plus the forestry and fishing sector. In the table, 
lag numbers of  other explanatory variables also change; hence, we have different values of  SC with the same lag 
numbers for basic R&D and applied R&D. 
show that the coefficient estimate for agricultural patents is significant and negative 
(table 4), which is in contrast to the model's assumption. 
The index of  prices  received by farmers does not have a  significant  coefficient 
estimate (table 4). Contrary to what the theoretical model predicted, the  index of prices 
used as a proxy for the variable PA,,,,, the price of  output, does not appear to have a 
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As reported in table 4, the coefficient estimate for extension spending is negative 
and significant. This variable was utilized as a proxy for the variable A(E),  the produc- 
tivity parameter, given the importance of  extension activities in the U.S. agricultural 
sector for the dissemination and adoption of new technology. However, within the 
framework of this analysis and data set, this impact is found to be negative, rather than 
positive. 
The theoretical model indicates private R&D investment and the two inputs to the 
production process-land  and labor-have  a positive relationship. The private R&D 
sector produces intermediate goods used in the production of agricultural output. Thus, 
a higher demand for intermediate goods translates into a higher private R&D invest- 
ment. As shown by footnote 6,  demand for intermediate goods is positively linked to land 
and labor. Thus, the model predicts the coefficient estimates of  the land and labor 
variables should be positive. Indeed, table 4 confirms a positive and significant 
coefficient estimate for the labor variable. The land variable, however, is found to have 
a significant but negative coefficient estimate. Both land in farms and agricultural 
employment in the United States exhibit a significant downward trend in the period of 
this study, although for agricultural employment this trend appears  to  be less steep over 
the last two decades. This distinct trend is in contrast to the strong upward trend in 
private R&D investment in the agricultural sector. General economic pressure that led 
to the shrinkage of  U.S. agricultural land may be responsible for the land variable's 
significantly negative coefficient estimate. Forces such as industrialization of the agri- 
cultural sector and urbanization have contributed to this steady decline in farmland, 
and were not included in this study. 
Finally, the real interest rate represents the opportunity cost of private R&D invest- 
ment in the model (table 4). This variable has a negative and significant coefficient 
estimate, consistent with the model's results. 
Concluding Remarks 
This study utilizes a quality innovation model in which technical change is the result 
of commercially motivated efforts of researchers responding to economic incentives and 
a public R&D sector. First, a model is presented to show the mechanism of  how the 
domestic R&D  sector operates. In the model, both public and private R&D  sectors 
directly affect the  creation of new technology,  which in turn increases output. The public 
R&D investment directly affects the private R&D sector and contributes indirectly to 
inventions and productivity as well. The analysis of  the liaison between these two 
sectors in a quality innovation model is a departure from previous research. 
Public R&D's complementary role to the private R&D sector is included through the 
parameter s, a subsidy equivalent of public-sector activities which decreases the cost of 
R&D for the private R&D sector, such as basic research. Public R&D7s  substitute role 
to the private R&D sector is included through the  probability of innovation by the  public 
R&D  sector. By  engaging in activities which attempt to create higher-quality inter- 
mediate goods,  the  public R&D sector can displace the  incumbent private R&D firm that 
produces the highest-quality intermediate good, and thereby potentially "crowd out" 
private R&D spending. The combined effect of these two activities on private R&D 
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In the empirical analysis, the implications of the  model are  tested for the  U.S. agricul- 
tural sector using 1970-1996  data. Basic public R&D, as measured by federal R&D 
obligations for basic research, has a positive and significant coefficient estimate. Findings 
of the empirical analysis reveal that federal R&D obligations for basic research, used 
as a proxy for the complementary role of public R&D, have a significant and positive 
impact on private R&D spending, which is consistent with the theoretical model 
prediction. Applied public R&D, as measured by federal R&D obligations for applied 
research, is not found to have a significant coefficient estimate. Based on the empirical 
analysis,  federal R&D obligations for applied research, used as  a proxy for the  substitute 
role of  public R&D, do not have a significant impact on private R&D  spending-a 
finding contrary to the prediction of the theoretical model. 
The agricultural patents variable is added to capture the effect of  past innovations 
on private R&D investment. The coefficient estimate for agricultural patents is signifi- 
cant and negative, which is in contrast to the model's prediction. Contrary to what the 
theoretical model suggested, the index of prices received by farmers used as a proxy for 
the price of  output does not have a significant effect on the resources allocated to 
agricultural R&D by the private sector. 
Extension spending was utilized as a proxy for the productivity parameter, as 
extension activities have been significant in the U.S. agricultural sector for the 
dissemination and adoption of new technology. However, within the framework of this 
analysis and data  set,  this impact is  negative rather than positive. The empirical results 
show the labor variable, one of the inputs to the production process, has a positive and 
significant coefficient estimate, as predicted by the model. The land variable, on the 
other hand, has a negative and significant coefficient estimate. Both land in farms and 
agricultural employment in the United States have experienced a downward trend in 
the period of this study, in contrast to the strong upward trend in private R&D invest- 
ment in the agricultural sector. Forces such as industrialization of  the agricultural 
sector and urbanization which have contributed to this decline in farmland are not 
included in this study and may be responsible for the significantly negative coefficient 
estimate for the land variable. The real interest rate, representing the opportunity cost 
of  private R&D investment in the model, has a negative and significant coefficient 
estimate, which is in agreement with the model's results. 
In summary, this study provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of  private 
agricultural R&D spending in the United States  for the period 1970-1996. Our findings 
suggest that public R&D  sector activities which focus on basic research benefit the 
private R&D sector. Accordingly, this positive impact needs to be considered when 
designing a role for the public R&D sector. 
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APPENDIX  k. 
Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
for Variables in Levels 
Table Al. U.S. Private R&D S~endint? 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
me  Lags  Rho  Pr < Rho  Tau  Pr  < Tau  F  PrzF 
Zero Mean  0  0.0914  0.6974  3.58  0.9998 
1  0.0895  0.6967  2.92  0.9987 
2  0.0851  0.6955  2.23  0.9925 
3  0.0823  0.6947  1.87  0.9831 
4  0.0797  0.6938  2.03  0.9880 
5  0.0690  0.6911  1.79  0.9798 
6  0.0679  0.6906  2.23  0.9923 
Single Mean  0  -0.9312  0.8865  -1.05  0.7253  7.15  0.0010 
1  -1.0436  0.8757  - 1.13  0.6946  5.08  0.0442 
2  -1.0798  0.8720  -1.02  0.7367  3.10  0.3055 
3  - 1.2294  0.8568  -  1.05  0.7242  2.39  0.4786 
4  - 1.0625  0.8733  -1.03  0.7304  2.69  0.4044 
5  -0.3987  0.9282  -0.40  0.8968  1.66  0.6557 
6  -0.1396  0.9442  -0.18  0.9302  2.43  0.4688 
Trend  0  -7.8525  0.5516  -  1.94  0.6123  2.12  0.7586 
1  -9.9581  0.3793  -2.05  0.5558  2.38  0.7087 
2  -  18.6230  0.0463  -2.41  0.3666  3.10  0.5743 
3  -53.4308  < 0.0001  -2.79  0.2101  4.10  0.3851 
4  -  104.4930  0.0001  -2.50  0.3263  3.37  0.5228 
5  62.7536  0.9999  -2.69  0.2468  3.62  0.4752 
6  72.0690  0.9999  -2.31  0.4158  2.68  0.6537 
Table A2. U.S. Extension Spending 
Aumented Dickev-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
me  Lags  Rho  Pr<Rho  Tau  Pr  < Tau  F  Pr>F 
Zero Mean  0  0.0302  0.6835  0.42  0.7999 
1  0.0304  0.6834  0.71  0.8646 
2  0.0299  0.6831  0.98  0.9101 
3  0.0291  0.6827  1.11  0.9270 
4  0.0284  0.6823  1.16  0.9331 
5  0.0279  0.6819  1.23  0.9412 
6  0.0272  0.6815  1.24  0.9417 
Single Mean  0  -13.2151  0.0422  -2.94  0.0502  4.46  0.0720 
1  - 7.0564  0.2429  -2.05  0.2653  2.40  0.4751 
2  -4.6253  0.4480  - 1.73  0.4090  2.03  0.5663 
3  -3.9494  0.5228  - 1.64  0.4540  2.01  0.5708 
4  -3.7062  0.5512  - 1.59  0.4739  2.01  0.5716 
5  -3.4102  0.5870  -  1.56  0.4920  2.04  0.5626 
6  -3.3301  0.5963  - 1.54  0.4980  2.03  0.5648 
Trend  0  -33.1644  0.0003  -5.22  0.0008  13.74  0.0010 
1  -30.0764  0.0010  -3.51  0.0538  6.37  0.0659 
2  -24.6919  0.0068  -2.59  0.2885  3.68  0.4644 
3  -28.7322  0.0014  -2.26  0.4445  2.97  0.5979 
4  -50.3737  < 0.0001  -2.12  0.5155  2.74  0.6416 
5  - 116.4100  0.0001  - 1.93  0.6160  2.42  0.7019 
6  84.6953  0.9999  -1.85  0.6559  2.33  0.7191 230  August 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table A3. Patents (Sectors 1-7) 
Auemented Dickev-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
Type  Lags  Rho  Pr < Rho  Tau  Pr < Tau  F  Pr>F 
Zero Mean  0  0.8700  0.8808  2.24  0.9928 
1  0.8351  0.8737  2.88  0.9986 
2  0.8179  0.8700  2.18  0.9917 
3  0.7800  0.8619  2.28  0.9933 
4  0.6988  0.8439  2.13  0.9905 
5  0.6915  0.8419  1.77  0.9790 
6  0.5898  0.8177  2.05  0.9883 
Single Mean  0  1.5740  0.9937  0.68  0.9900  2.48  0.4550 
1  1.8749  0.9959  1.11  0.9968  4.29  0.0812 
2  1.9394  0.9962  0.93  0.9947  2.49  0.4527 
3  1.8707  0.9957  1.00  0.9956  2.73  0.3945 
4  2.7199  0.9988  1.76  0.9995  3.36  0.2403 
5  2.7546  0.9988  1.65  0.9993  2.58  0.4325 
6  2.7936  0.9988  2.77  0.9999  5.56  0.0315 
Trend  0  -5.2086  0.7857  -  1.02  0.9280  1.35  0.9038 
1  -0.9881  0.9855  -0.24  0.9893  0.93  0.9752 
2  -3.0259  0.9283  -0.54  0.9765  0.98  0.9687 
3  -  1.4416  0.9780  -0.28  0.9880  0.79  0.9874 
4  0.9730  0.9981  0.23  0.9972  1.67  0.8441 
5  0.6560  0.9972  0.13  0.9962  1.52  0.8724 
6  2.4260  0.9996  0.94  0.9998  3.70  0.4599 
- 
Table A4. Patents (Sectors 1-8) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
Type  Lags  Rho  Pr  < Rho  Tau  Pr c  Tau  F  Pr > F 
Zero Mean  0  0.8222  0.8714  2.23  0.9926 
1  0.7865  0.8639  2.84  0.9984 
2  0.7671  0.8595  2.12  0.9903 
3  0.7347  0.8522  2.24  0.9927 
4  0.6599  0.8350  2.09  0.9895 
5  0.6520  0.8328  1.71  0.9761 
6  0.5566  0.8097  1.97  0.9863 
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Table A5. Real Interest Rate 
Aumented Dickev-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
'be  Lags  Rho  Pr < Rho  Tau  F'r  < Tau  F  Pr>F 
Zero Mean  0  -6.8651  0.0635  -  1.92  0.0527 
1  - 14.7174  0.0046  -2.59  0.0111 
2  -6.0017  0.0837  -1.57  0.1084 
3  -9.8462  0.0233  -  1.79  0.0705 
4  -4.7780  0.1245  -  1.27  0.1824 
5  -7.4172  0.0519  -  1.37  0.1556 
6  -  12.6941  0.0086  - 1.53  0.1150 







Trend  0 
Table A6. Land in Farms 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
'be  Lags  Rho  F'r  < Rho  Tau  F'r  < Tau  F  F'r>F 
Zero Mean  0  -0.0147  0.6735  -9.93  < 0.0001 
1  -0.0142  0.6734  -5.16  < 0.0001 
2  -0.0137  0.6734  -3.74  0.0005 
3  -0.0134  0.6732  - 3.54  0.0008 
4  - 0.0130  0.6731  -3.42  0.0012 
5  -0.0126  0.6729  -3.18  0.0024 
6  -0.0122  0.6728  -2.60  0.0111 
Single Mean  0  -0.4732  0.9239  - 1.39  0.5740  51.42  0.0010 
1  -0.4537  0.9251  -  1.38  0.5793  14.51  0.0010 
2  -0.4282  0.9267  - 1.30  0.6177  7.93  0.0010 
3  -0.3903  0.9292  - 1.38  0.5789  7.33  0.0010 
4  -0.4160  0.9272  -  1.76  0.3920  7.74  0.0010 
5  -0.4198  0.9267  -2.11  0.2440  7.82  0.0010 
6  -0.4087  0.9273  -  2.12  0.2381  6.02  0.0208 
Trend  0  -8.0941  0.5305  -  1.98  0.5949  2.79  0.6329 
1  -8.7303  0.4751  - 1.88  0.6429  2.60  0.6678 
2  -  10.2275  0.3580  - 1.84  0.6617  2.43  0.6996 
3  -7.8991  0.5433  - 1.53  0.7984  2.01  0.7784 
4  -5.5259  0.7561  - 1.24  0.8852  2.19  0.7455 
5  -3.6497  0.8949  - 1.00  0.9290  2.56  0.6751 
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Table A7. Agricultural Employment 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
Type  Lags  Rho  Pr < Rho  Tau  Pr < Tau  F  Pr>F 
Zero Mean  0  -0.0579  0.6639  -2.47  0.0148 
1  -0.0495  0.6656  -  1.46  0.1327 
2  -0.0405  0.6674  -1.04  0.2636 
3  -0.0168  0.6725  -0.31  0.5646 
4  0.0075  0.6776  0.11  0.7112 
5  0.0171  0.6795  0.24  0.7500 
6  0.0086  0.6774  0.20  0.7366 
Single Mean  0  -4.9668  0.4143  -4.86  0.0004  16.50  0.0010 
1  -5.3634  0.3754  -4.15  0.0024  10.07  0.0010 
2  -5.6832  0.3458  -3.96  0.0041  8.58  0.0010 
3  -5.9922  0.3189  -3.39  0.0181  5.81  0.0248 
4  -6.9209  0.2491  -3.22  0.0278  5.18  0.0414 
5  -8.1219  0.1784  -3.59  0.0116  6.48  0.0120 
6  -7.2378  0.2266  -2.50  0.1255  3.15  0.2931 
Trend  0  -3.6776  0.8949  -2.13  0.5121  12.17  0.0010 
1  -  4.0097  0.8742  -2.26  0.4449  8.87  0.0080 
2  -3.9909  0.8750  -2.37  0.3878  8.35  0.0163 
3  -4.3260  0.8520  -2.33  0.4047  6.15  0.0760 
4  -5.8305  0.7294  -2.55  0.3054  5.11  0.1938 
5  -7.5974  0.5671  -3.02  0.1429  6.19  0.0741 
6  -5.8793  0.7230  -  1.97  0.5957  3.12  0.5702 
Table AS. Price Index 
Auemented Dickev-Fuller Unit Root Testa 
Type  Lags  Rho  Pr < Rho  Tau  Pr < Tau  F  Pr>F 
Zero Mean  0  -0.0880  0.6572  -0.95  0.2997 
1  -0.0846  0.6578  -0.72  0.3998 
2  -0.0876  0.6569  -1.05  0.2595 
3  -0.0843  0.6575  - 1.03  0.2683 
4  -0.0799  0.6583  -1.10  0.2408 
5  -0.0824  0.6575  -0.90  0.3192 
6  -0.0853  0.6566  -1.10  0.2382 
Single Mean  0  -2.0854  0.7585  -0.88  0.7838  0.80  0.8664 
1  -4.3597  0.4774  -1.31  0.6161  1.08  0.7980 
2  -  1.6776  0.8074  -0.68  0.8380  0.75  0.8787 
3  - 1.5150  0.8259  -0.59  0.8591  0.67  0.8980 
4  -  0.6090  0.9130  -0.27  0.9188  0.61  0.9162 
5  -2.5244  0.7007  -0.68  0.8371  0.61  0.9167 
6  -  1.3342  0.8449  -0.45  0.8869  0.67  0.8964 
Trend  0  -6.7633  0.6491  -1.91  0.6306  1.92  0.7966 
1  - 12.8166  0.2086  -2.44  0.3536  3.02  0.5891 
2  -7.2356  0.6041  -1.74  0.7132  1.64  0.8482 
3  -7.7281  0.5584  - 1.69  0.7317  1.62  0.8523 
4  -6.1577  0.7000  - 1.52  0.8006  1.59  0.8590 
5  -  13.3247  0.1778  -  1.77  0.6974  1.74  0.8296 
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Table A9. Federal Obligations for Basic R&D 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
Type  Lags  Rho  Pr < Rho  Tau  Pr < Tau  F  Pr>F 
Zero Mean  0  0.0449  0.6833  2.70  0.9973 
1  0.0441  0.6830  2.30  0.9931 
2  0.0351  0.6806  1.23  0.9393 
3  0.0423  0.6805  1.78  0.9783 
4  0.0396  0.6806  1.47  0.9606 
5  0.0333  0.6783  0.75  0.8681 
6  0.0237  0.6747  0.29  0.7601 
Single Mean  0  -  1.6404  0.8079  - 1.78  0.3831  5.65  0.0290 
1  -  1.8093  0.7879  -2.01  0.2810  5.14  0.0517 
2  -  1.7347  0.7962  - 1.41  0.5622  1.82  0.6312 
3  - 1.9536  0.7696  -2.19  0.2166  4.39  0.0871 
4  -  1.9629  0.7678  -2.25  0.1957  3.97  0.1343 
5  -2.4785  0.7022  -2.20  0.2108  2.82  0.3988 
6  -3.3912  0.5822  -2.88  0.0650  4.24  0.0942 
Trend  0  -  1.5164  0.9753  -0.49  0.9773  1.52  0.8725 
1  -0.8288  0.9862  -0.27  0.9869  1.99  0.7850 
2  -3.3825  0.9066  -0.67  0.9645  0.99  0.9630 
3  -0.1662  0.9923  -0.06  0.9924  2.43  0.7085 
4  0.8284  0.9971  0.37  0.9977  3.00  0.6081 
5  0.4962  0.9958  0.18  0.9960  2.61  0.6768 
6  -0.2013  0.9915  -0.07  0.9915  4.09  0.4181 
Table A10. Federal Obligations for A~~lied  R&D 
Auemented Dickev-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
Type  Lags  Rho  Pr < Rho  Tau  F'r  < Tau  F  Pr>F 
Zen, Mean  0  0.0373  0.6815  1.63  0.9715 
1  0.0334  0.6804  1.16  0.9316 
2  0.0265  0.6785  0.77  0.8731 
3  0.0278  0.6770  0.73  0.8655 
4  0.0211  0.6760  0.78  0.8750 
5  0.0229  0.6758  1.24  0.9392 
6  0.0254  0.6751  1.01  0.9113 
Single Mean  0  -4.2459  0.4860  - 1.96  0.3028  3.44  0.2224 
1  -5.8619  0.3193  - 1.98  0.2930  2.74  0.4174 
2  -7.7199  0.1872  - 1.82  0.3646  1.99  0.5906 
3  - 16.6302  0.0090  -2.35  0.1664  3.10  0.3342 
4  -9.1594  0.1184  - 1.51  0.5073  1.49  0.7072 
5  -3.9433  0.5146  -0.88  0.7741  1.15  0.7857 
6  -67.8006  < 0.0001  - 1.63  0.4503  1.91  0.6088 
Trend  0  -6.1334  0.6944  -2.01  0.5672  2.29  0.7257 
1  -9.7507  0.3707  -2.27  0.4318  2.69  0.6617 
2  - 19.5330  0.0229  -2.52  0.3153  3.18  0.5762 
3  -410.3600  0.0001  -3.37  0.0808  5.68  0.1403 
4  936.2688  0.9999  -2.48  0.3334  3.08  0.5940 
5  -45.5576  < 0.0001  - 1.61  0.7538  1.32  0.9019 
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APPENDIX  B: 
Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
for First-Differenced Variables 
Table B1.  U.S. Private R&D Spending 
Augmented Dickev-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
Type  Lags  Rho  Pr<Rho  Tau  Pr  < Tau  F  Pr>F 
Zero Mean  0  -25.3271  c 0.0001  -4.40  c 0.0001 
1  -  14.1970  0.0055  -2.61  0.0104 
2  -9.1012  0.0299  - 1.94  0.0505 
3  - 10.2971  0.0199  - 1.89  0.0565 
4  -8.9555  0.0310  -1.99  0.0456 
5  - 12.3215  0.0098  -2.08  0.0379 
6  -  10.0005  0.0212  -1.55  0.1111 
Single Mean  0  -34.9750  0.0002  -5.71  0.0002  16.31  0.0010 
1  -28.2965  0.0002  -3.59  0.0110  6.44  0.0129 
2  -24.6167  0.0007  -2.79  0.0706  3.89  0.1120 
3  -52.8970  0.0002  -2.88  0.0584  4.16  0.0882 
4  -61.4800  0.0002  -2.70  0.0855  3.79  0.1356 
5  58.1812  0.9999  -3.12  0.0351  5.04  0.0453 
6  22.9724  0.9999  -3.05  0.0415  4.67  0.0604 
Trend  0  -35.3558  < 0.0001  -5.71  0.0002  16.33  0.0010 
1  -29.3405  0.0012  -3.59  0.0455  6.45  0.0624 
2  -26.0590  0.0039  -2.81  0.2038  3.96  0.4120 
3  -61.8055  < 0.0001  -2.92  0.1702  4.26  0.3539 
4  -61.8991  <0.0001  -2.60  0.2818  3.49  0.4997 
5  59.4666  0.9999  -3.01  0.1453  4.67  0.2772 
6  22.5167  0.9999  -3.00  0.1499  4.50  0.3100 
Table B2. U.S. Extension Spending 
Augmented DiJrey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
Me  Lags  Rho  Pr<Rho  Tau  Pr < Tau  F  Pr>F 
Zero Mean  0  -51.6193  c 0.0001  -9.78  c 0.0001 
1  -97.6653  < 0.0001  -6.79  < 0.0001 
2  -241.8210  0.0001  -4.87  < 0.0001 
3  10,739.91  0.9999  -3.76  0.0005 
4  159.9175  0.9999  -3.17  0.0025 
5  115.1337  0.9999  -2.64  0.0099 
6  56.0177  0.9999  -2.37  0.0192 
Single Mean  0  -51.9480  0.0002 
1  -103.5330  0.0001 
2  -449.6750  0.0001 
3  208.4110  0.9999 
4  65.1405  0.9999 
5  40.2625  0.9999 
6  23.6790  0.9999 
Trend  0  -52.1177  c 0.0001 
1  -106.6120  0.0001 
2  -737.7340  0.0001 
3  150.4995  0.9999 
4  54.7632  0.9999 
5  33.8220  0.9999 
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Table B3. Patents (Sectors 1-7) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
'Me  Lags  Rho  Pr < Rho  Tau  F'r < Tau  F  Pr>F 
Zero Mean  0  -41.1918  <0.0001  -6.15  < 0.0001 
1  -20.2064  0.0006  -2.71  0.0082 
2  - 18.6902  0.0011  -2.13  0.0338 
3  - 15.6374  0.0032  -  1.82  0.0658 
4  -6.6430  0.0671  -1.11  0.2346 
5  -  11.2857  0.0140  - 1.33  0.1665 
6  -1.1187  0.4486  -0.33  0.5571 
Single Mean  0  -46.4277  0.0002  -7.20  0.0002  26.09  0.0010 
1  -31.9349  0.0002  -3.47  0.0149  6.10  0.0193 
2  -  46.5721  0.0002  -3.04  0.0410  4.76  0.0555 
3  -61.0309  0.0002  -2.62  0.0985  3.48  0.2132 
4  -28.4865  0.0002  -  1.85  0.3503  1.78  0.6260 
5  298.0394  0.9999  -2.12  0.2395  2.27  0.5081 
6  -6.7574  0.2542  -0.89  0.7770  0.47  0.9573 
Trend  0  -47.3322  < 0.0001  -7.40  0.0001  27.53  0.0010 
1  -35.2549  < 0.0001  -3.68  0.0377  7.00  0.0437 
2  -55.4945  <0.0001  -3.25  0.0926  5.49  0.1224 
3  -112.8930  0.0001  -3.06  0.1329  5.45  0.1303 
4  -61.2124  < 0.0001  -2.36  0.3936  3.43  0.5107 
5  55.8385  0.9999  -3.04  0.1378  6.06  0.0797 
6  -44.7237  <0.0001  -2.09  0.5293  4.00  0.4034 
Table B4. Patents (Sectors 1-8) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
we  La@  Rho  F'r  < Rho  Tau  F'r  < Tau  F  F'r>F 
Zero Mean  0  -41.0632  <0.0001  -6.10  <0.0001 
1  -  19.8435  0.0007  -2.68  0.0087 
2  -  18.9890  0.0009  -2.14  0.0328 
3  - 15.9039  0.0029  -  1.82  0.0662 
4  -6.5785  0.0685  -1.11  0.2348 
5  -11.6466  0.0124  -1.33  0.1657 
6  -  1.2612  0.4260  -0.36  0.5452 
Single Mean  0  -46.2547  0.0002  -7.12  0.0002  25.51  0.0010 
1  - 30.9055  0.0002  -3.40  0.0174  5.87  0.0237 
2  -46.0468  0.0002  -3.03  0.0424  4.71  0.0581 
3  -60.3811  0.0002  -2.60  0.1022  3.43  0.2239 
4  -26.0351  0.0004  -  1.82  0.3660  1.72  0.6418 
5  378.9620  0.9999  -2.10  0.2476  2.22  0.5185 
6  -7.0537  0.2342  - 0.91  0.7695  0.49  0.9522 
Trend  0  -47.1728  < 0.0001  -7.32  0.0001  27.00  0.0010 
1  -34.3264  0.0001  -3.64  0.0416  6.88  0.0466 
2  -55.4395  <  0.0001  -3.25  0.0923  5.50  0.1200 
3  -115.0540  0.0001  -3.05  0.1350  5.37  0.1445 
4  -56.3990  <  0.0001  -2.34  0.3996  3.42  0.5138 
5  55.7816  0.9999  -3.02  0.1436  5.89  0.0874 
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Table B5. Real Interest Rate 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
Type  Lags  Rho  Pr < Rho  Tau  Pr < Tau  F  Pr > F 
Zero Mean  0  -26.0759  <  0.0001  -4.52  <  0.0001 
1  -73.1074  <0.0001  -5.88  <  0.0001 
2  -44.3846  < 0.0001  -3.45  0.0011 
3  193.6401  0.9999  -4.06  0.0002 
4  -137.2790  0.0001  -2.76  0.0074 
5  -107.2740  0.0001  -2.29  0.0232 
6  92.3869  0.9999  -2.31  0.0225 
Single Mean  0  -26.0736  0.0005  -4.45  0.0011  9.91  0.0010 
1  -73.0942  0.0002  -5.79  0.0002  16.75  0.0010 
2  -44.3126  0.0002  -3.39  0.0182  5.76  0.0261 
3  194.0955  0.9999  -3.98  0.0041  7.94  0.0010 
4  -135.7270  0.0001  -2.70  0.0848  3.67  0.1666 
5  -107.2370  0.0001  -2.24  0.1959  2.52  0.4469 
6  92.9558  0.9999  -2.26  0.1920  2.58  0.4313 
Trend  0  -26.1340  0.0044  -4.38  0.0071  9.62  0.0010 
1  -73.7599  < 0.0001  -5.72  0.0003  16.35  0.0010 
2  -44.7821  < 0.0001  -3.35  0.0762  5.61  0.1000 
3  187.4199  0.9999  -3.93  0.0221  7.76  0.0262 
4  -142.3930  0.0001  -2.65  0.2628  3.52  0.4952 
5  -131.3900  0.0001  -2.23  0.4589  2.49  0.6887 
6  94.0852  0.9999  -2.18  0.4799  2.43  0.7009 
Table B6. Land in  Farms 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
Type  Lags  Rho  Pr < Rho  Tau  Pr < Tau  F  Pr>F 
Zero Mean  0  - 10.1229  0.0216  -2.45  0.0157 
1  -4.2419  0.1493  - 1.51  0.1202 
2  -2.8839  0.2372  - 1.24  0.1917 
3  - 1.8900  0.3384  -0.96  0.2920 
4  - 1.2621  0.4238  -0.79  0.3678 
5  -0.8486  0.4929  -0.70  0.4038 
6  -0.6274  0.5351  -0.70  0.4056 
Single Mean  0  -36.9898  0.0002  -6.07  0.0002  18.43  0.0010 
1  -37.7523  0.0002  -4.12  0.0027  8.53  0.0010 
2  -69.8891  0.0002  -3.80  0.0066  7.25  0.0010 
3  - 1,417.41  0.0001  -3.57  0.0120  6.38  0.0140 
4  82.6818  0.9999  -3.26  0.0253  5.34  0.0373 
5  68.0888  0.9999  -2.66  0.0925  3.58  0.1886 
6  228.5791  0.9999  -2.06  0.2600  2.21  0.5209 
Trend  0  -38.4521  <  0.0001  -6.24  0.0001  19.48  0.0010 
1  -42.2367  < 0.0001  -4.31  0.0088  9.28  0.0015 
2  -95.6600  <  0.0001  -4.04  0.0170  8.17  0.0193 
3  147.2472  0.9999  -4.04  0.0174  8.18  0.0191 
4  41.0814  0.9999  -4.00  0.0194  8.04  0.0213 
5  27.1371  0.9999  -3.50  0.0576  6.14  0.0765 
6  22.5951  0.9999  -2.86  0.1888  4.10  0.3853 Tokgoz  Private Agricultural R&D in the United States  237 
Table B7. Agricultural Employment 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
%e  Lags  Rho  Pr < Rho  Tau  Pr < Tau  F  Pr>F 
Zero Mean  0  -21.7728  0.0003  -4.05  0.0002 
1  - 15.3870  0.0036  -2.92  0.0046 
2  -8.6427  0.0349  -2.17  0.0309 
3  -5.3514  0.1031  - 1.84  0.0633 
4  -4.8545  0.1211  - 1.74  0.0773 
5  -7.9778  0.0428  -2.55  0.0124 
6  -  7.8409  0.0444  -2.47  0.0154 
Single Mean  0  -24.8329  0.0007  -  4.33  0.0015  9.43  0.0010 
1  -  18.8288  0.0066  -  3.06  0.0392  4.77  0.0551 
2  -9.7163  0.1150  - 1.94  0.3130  2.31  0.4965 
3  -4.9876  0.4091  - 1.42  0.5614  1.64  0.6612 
4  -4.1407  0.4991  - 1.26  0.6338  1.49  0.6965 
5  -7.0971  0.2355  - 1.95  0.3083  3.15  0.2926 
6  -6.4992  0.2730  - 1.87  0.3398  2.97  0.3366 
Trend  0  -37.1931  < 0.0001  -5.98  0.0001  17.91  0.0010 
1  -49.5996  < 0.0001  -4.63  0.0039  10.78  0.0010 
2  -41.4299  < 0.0001  -3.21  0.1005  5.15  0.1876 
3  -22.0916  0.0149  -2.29  0.4283  2.63  0.6631 
4  -21.9989  0.0146  -2.02  0.5669  2.06  0.7699 
5  -44.3042  < 0.0001  -2.32  0.4092  3.03  0.5866 
6  -47.1228  < 0.0001  -2.14  0.5031  2.65  0.6592 
Table B8. Price Index 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
Type  Lags  Rho  Pr < Rho  Tau  Pr  < Tau  F  Pr>F 
Zero Mean  0  -27.0775  < 0.0001  -4.56  < 0.0001 
1  -52.6954  < 0.0001  -4.89  < 0.0001 
2  -54.6767  < 0.0001  - 3.64  0.0006 
3  -123.7030  0.0001  -3.32  0.0016 
4  -23.9665  0.0001  -  2.15  0.0323 
5  -80.9794  < 0.0001  -2.23  0.0271 
6  - 11.4861  0.0127  - 1.51  0.1201 
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Table B9. Federal Obligations for Basic R&D 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
'be  Lags  Rho  Pr < Rho  Tau  Pr  < Tau  F  R>F 
Zero Mean  0  - 19.4948  0.0005  -3.92  0.0004 
1  -8.7444  0.0307  -2.17  0.0310 
2  -9.4707  0.0231  -  1.87  0.0596 
3  -6.6183  0.0643  - 1.48  0.1244 
4  -2.6083  0.2564  -0.99  0.2741 
5  - 1.323 1  0.4133  -0.72  0.3922 
6  - 1.7033  0.3567  -0.91  0.3103 
Single Mean  0  -25.5895  0.0002  -4.87  0.0006  11.88  0.0010 
1  - 14.2246  0.0236  -2.50  0.1287  3.22  0.3081 
2  -33.0167  < 0.0001  -2.69  0.0906  3.62  0.2145 
3  -38.2239  < 0.0001  -2.15  0.2288  2.34  0.5095 
4  -8.3089  0.1516  - 1.21  0.6506  0.80  0.8663 
5  -2.7997  0.6592  -0.65  0.8377  0.30  0.9885 
6  -2.1906  0.7368  -0.49  0.8728  0.38  0.9747 
Trend  0  -28.7448  0.0004  -5.56  0.0007  15.50  0.0010 
1  - 19.0051  0.0276  -2.82  0.2032  3.99  0.4362 
2  -87.9564  < 0.0001  -3.67  0.0460  6.97  0.0601 
3  119.4563  0.9999  -3.43  0.0725  6.12  0.0920 
4  238.8002  0.9999  -2.61  0.2782  3.73  0.4800 
5  92.9105  0.9999  -2.77  0.2229  4.80  0.2945 
6  44.2286  0.9999  -2.25  0.4389  2.93  0.6206 
Table B10. Federal Obligations for A~~lied  R&D 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
'be  Lags  Rho  Pr  < Rho  Tau  Pr  < Tau  F  Pr>F 
Zero Mean  0  - 19.0444  0.0006  -3.88  0.0004 
1  -  12.5270  0.0079  -2.50  0.0146 
2  -9.8427  0.0203  -  1.90  0.0559 
3  -27.2700  < 0.0001  -2.45  0.0169 
4  74.9997  0.9999  -2.84  0.0067 
5  - 19.0326  0.0004  - 1.48  0.1240 
6  -373.6350  0.0001  - 1.89  0.0572 
Single Mean  0  -20.8877  0.0018  -4.08  0.0042  8.33  0.0010 
1  - 14.5267  0.0212  -2.60  0.1072  3.38  0.2699 
2  - 12.3758  0.0429  -2.02  0.2765  2.04  0.5785 
3  -43.0996  < 0.0001  -2.54  0.1202  3.25  0.3011 
4  33.0675  0.9999  -3.14  0.0386  4.94  0.0612 
5  -74,076.10  0.0001  - 1.80  0.3723  1.63  0.6752 
6  29.4769  0.9999  -2.01  0.2793  2.07  0.5729 
Trend  0  -21.2334  0.0131  -4.03  0.0212  8.12  0.0343 
1  - 14.5212  0.1142  -2.47  0.3373  3.21  0.5717 
2  - 12.6555  0.1846  -  1.94  0.6003  1.94  0.7928 
3  40.7144  < 0.0001  - 2.36  0.3867  3.04  0.6011 
4  34.5014  0.9999  -2.96  0.1656  4.64  0.3223 
5  -  3,497.51  0.0001  - 1.70  0.7130  1.49  0.8723 
6  47.7210  0.9999  -1.81  0.6591  2.26  0.7374 